This paper uses Guangzhou's experience of hosting the 2010 Asian Games to illustrate Guangzhou's engagement with scalar politics. This includes concurrent processes of intraregional restructuring to position Guangzhou as a central city in south China and a 'negotiated scale-jump' to connect with the world under conditions negotiated in part with the overarching strong central state, testing the limit of Guangzhou's geopolitical expansion. Guangzhou's attempts were aided further by using the Asian Games as a vehicle for addressing condensed urban spatial restructuring to enhance its own production/accumulation capacities, and for facilitating urban redevelopment projects to achieve a 'global' appearance and exploit the city's real estate development potential. Guangzhou's experience of hosting the Games provides important lessons for expanding our understanding of how regional cities may pursue their development goals under the strong central state and how event-led development contributes to this.
Introduction
In November 2010, Guangzhou received an international spotlight as the host of the Summer Asian Games. This was the culminating moment of six-year preparation after winning the bid.
Having taken place two years after the Beijing Olympic Games and only one month after the closing of the Shanghai World Expo, the Guangzhou Asian Games was China's finale of a series of mega-events. This paper is an attempt to examine how Guangzhou used the Asia Games strategically as a vehicle of fulfilling its development goals.
Mega-events are characterised for their huge consequences upon host cities, considerable exposure to (global) media coverage and discontinuity (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006) . Studies often produce three major motivations behind the promotion of mega-events. First, mega-events are promoted as a political project to legitimise the host nation's ruling regime, boost the national pride or attain a particular state vision (Black, 2007; Steenveld and Strelitz, 1998; Van der Westhuizen, 2004) . Second, mega-events are seen as a means for political elites and businesses to form a growth coalition to pin down global capital and visitors in host cities (Gratton, 2005; Burbank et al., 2001) . Third, from a local-central relations perspective, megaevents are promoted by local elites to attract central state subsidies or grants in order to finance development projects (Cochrane et al., 1996) . Guangzhou's experience seems to diverge from these. Compared with the Beijing Olympic Games or the Shanghai World Expo, the Asian Games remained as a relatively low-key event so that the fame of the preceding two national events would not diminish too soon. This also suggests that Guangzhou's experience might have more to tell beyond the promotion of national prestige. Furthermore, Guangzhou was not likely to use the Games as a means to attract central government subsidies to finance development projects: It had been enjoying China's third largest city status (after Shanghai and Beijing) in terms of the gross regional product.
Guangzhou is the capital city of the Guangdong province that commanded the largest provincial economy in mainland China. Nor did Guangzhou feel short of international visitors or global investment. As the host city of Canton Fair that has been the principal window of overseas trade for the whole China since the 1950s, Guangzhou as well as other cities in the Pearl River Delta (hereafter PRD) region have been inundated with international visitors and capital investment, including those originating from or channelled through Hong Kong.
This paper uses Guangzhou's experiences of hosting the 2010 Asian Games to illustrate
Guangzhou's engagement with scalar politics that includes both intra-regional restructuring and a 'negotiated scale-jump' as a way of addressing its development vision. Instead of 'breaking away' from the central state, Guangzhou aimed at jumping scale to connect with the world under conditions negotiated in part with the state. In doing so, the promotion of Guangzhou as the international regional centre was what the municipality adopted as a discourse to justify the state intervention in the built environment through facilitating urban spatial restructuring and redevelopment. The discussions in this paper are based on the author's qualitative in-depth interviews with key informants (ten government officials at district and municipal levels, seven academics and six professional experts including three working for international firms operating in Guangzhou), 1 archival records and observation during field visits. These took place between September 2009 and May 2011.
Spatial restructuring, event-led development and local-central state relations
From the perspectives of globalisation and inter-urban competition, cities are driven into competition for increasingly footloose investment capital, transnational firms and visitors. Many
Western cities in particular have faced post-industrial structural changes that accompanied the declining competitiveness of traditional secondary industries as well as the demise of the Keynesian welfare statism. Under these circumstances, local states are viewed as being under pressure to become more entrepreneurial to address the problems of limited financial resources.
Business interests rise as key partners of local states, forming a growth coalition with diverse sectors to promote "value-free development" and make localities more amenable to investors' needs (Logan and Molotch, 1987) . Various strategies emerge to support this process, including place promotion, image re-branding or signature architecture (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005) .
The key to this process is to make sure mobile assets become 'sticky' to a locale through enacting developmental projects (Shin, 2007) .
Some post-industrial cities choose the path of promoting 'consumption-oriented economic development' that emphasises consumption activities such as sports and entertainment (Judd and Fainstein, 1999) . Place-dependent local growth advocates have increasingly drawn towards using mega-event hosting as a vehicle to meet their growth desire (Burbank et al., 2001) . Megaevent hosting not only contributes to urban transformation for the pursuit of visitors' pleasure 1 In order to understand the ways in which the municipality made use of the Asian Games to fulfill its own vision, the interviews focused on this particular group of informants who were closely involved in working with or for the government. Professionals included experts in urban design and architecture firms.
but also acts as a catalyst to event-led development, aimed at providing event facilities and supporting infrastructure (Smith, 2012) . Projects are put forward in the name of mega-events, "even if they have little relevance to a sporting event" (Burbank et al., 2001:29) . In this process, the role of the state is important, for it coordinates the circulation of surplus capital and its channelling into the built environment (Harvey, 1978 ). An event-led growth strategy may demonstrate the redefinition of the meaning of the state (Cochrane et al., 1996) .
The emphasis on local scales and the attention to cities in the broader framework of globalisation and inter-urban competition raises a question about local-central state relations.
Such relations are compounded by 'glocalisation' processes that entail substantial changes to the scale of economic networks and regulatory arrangements. These changes involve the national scale shifting upwards to supra-national/global scales and simultaneously downwards to local/regional scales (Swyngedouw, 2004) . Cities pursuing global investment and visitors may consequently experience inter-scalar tensions, often engaging in scalar politics to get things done. In particular, when facing conflicts and contestation over pursuing a particular regulatory project to enable local accumulation, place-dependent alliances at local scales may attempt to 'jump scale', bypassing the central state and connecting directly with transnational actors (Park, 2005) . Following Neil Brenner who interprets globalisation as "a multi-scalar restructuring of capitalist territorial organization" (Brenner, 1999:68;  original emphasis), the scale-jump is viewed as a deterritorialisation strategy that aims "to circumvent or dismantle historically entrenched forms of territorial organization and their associated scalar morphologies" (ibid.:62).
While the scale-jump might be a denationalisation strategy, the importance of the nation-state scale does not diminish (Brenner, 1999) . Scalar politics may also be employed by the socially disadvantaged in order "to resist oppression and exploitation at a higher scale", as shown vividly by Neil Smith in his discussion of the Homeless Vehicle scheme in New York in the late 1980s (Smith, 1992:60) . Mega-events promoted by territorial alliances would also display how the scalar politics have played out at local, national and global scales.
Shifting our attention to mainland China, it is questionable if mega-event hosting follows the post-industrial logic of consumption-oriented economic development. China's mega-events have served multiple purposes such as pacifying social unrests, ensuring socio-political stability and facilitating capital accumulation and spatial restructuring (Brady, 2009; Broudehoux, 2007; ). China's mega-events are also closely related with the recent regional development strategies, which have focused on producing mega-city regions, each of them centred on key sites of capital accumulation and political influence in respective regions (Wu and Zhang, 2007 (Xu and Yeh, 2005; Zhu, 2004) . Critics have also noted the increasing entrepreneurial behaviour of local states in promoting local development, leading to the rise of state entrepreneurialism (Duckett, 1996) or local state corporatism (Oi, 1995) . Local states may endeavour to make directive investment decisions in order to concentrate finite resources on key areas identified in strategic development plans and to realise local leaders' particular development visions (Wu and Zhang, 2007) . Various spatial strategies have emerged to facilitate urban accumulation centred on using land resources (Lin, 2007) . Hsing (2010) for instance discusses how urban governments have concentrated their resources on establishing 'new towns', with real estate developers as key partners. Local states would also take an entrepreneurial approach to redevelopment in their pursuit of urban accumulation (Shin, 2009 ).
Nevertheless, critics are also keen to emphasise the political importance of the central state in shaping local development agendas (Chen, 2009; Xu and Yeh, 2009 
Scalar Politics: Guangzhou, the PRD and the World
Guangzhou's long-term development vision has gone through major changes over the years.
Guangzhou initially envisaged an "economic centre in southern China in the early 1990s" (Xu and Yeh, 2003:367) , but over time, it added an international dimension. In 1995, Guangzhou proposed to "overtake the 'four little dragons' in Asia" by 2010, and become "an international metropolitan city, and the financial, trade and tourist centre in Asia-Pacific region" (Guangzhou Yearbook Editorial Committee, 1995 cited in Xu and Yeh, 2003:365-366) . By late 1998, it envisioned a 'regional central city in the world' (ibid.:368). As Guangzhou had been making frequent references to Year 2010 (the final year of implementing the 11th Five-Year Plan) for streamlining its development projects, the 2010 Asian Games hosting came as a golden opportunity to realise its long-term vision to become a 'world-class city'.
Guangzhou is also the provincial capital of the Guangdong province, the largest provincial economy in China for many decades. This makes Guangzhou the political centre of the PRD region that has come to serve the global market as the 'factory of the world'. Various projects including the construction of a brand new central business district (hereafter CBD) were conceived by the municipal officials as a means to prepare Guangzhou for the 21st century, promoting the city in the "world urban hierarchy as a regional international financial and service center" (Zhu et al., 2011:226) . As local academics suggest, the Asian Games hosting could be interpreted as a means to achieve this strategy and gain recognition:
"The Guangzhou government used the Asian Games just to promote the city's level, because they wanted to develop Guangzhou as an important Asian city, like Seoul, Tokyo, Taipei and
Singapore. Up to these cities' level" (Dr Deng, Guangzhou Academy of Social Science Guangzhou's supremacy in this competition. While interviewees often referred to the fact that
Beijing was able to mobilise not only their own but the national resources to make the Olympic Games successful, it was equally pointed out that Guangzhou was on its own without much financial support from the provincial government either. When the municipal government produced a comprehensive plan for the provision of Games venues and related facilities, the provincial contribution to the total planned expenditure was only about 4. Guangzhou's development vision and the city's attempt to realise it through the Asian Games preparation has resulted in some economic success. As shown in Table 1 , while the country as a whole was experiencing an average growth rates of 9.76 and 11.21 percent during the 10th and 11th five-year economic period respectively, Guangzhou outperformed these, registering nearly 14 percent annually during the ten-year period. Accordingly, Guangzhou displayed high productivity with its per capita GDP of 87,458 yuan in 2010: this was twice as high as that of the Guangdong province, and about 15 percent higher than those of Beijing and Shanghai. In fact, Guangzhou's high growth rates during the last ten years enabled it to overtake Shanghai's productivity. Guangzhou's rapid development is also reflected in the rise of urban residents'
income. By 2010, Guangzhou became almost on par with Beijing or Shanghai in terms of urban residents' disposable income, and also considerably reduced the income gap in comparison with Shenzhen.
( Table 1 here)
Condensed urban spatial restructuring
Guangzhou's long-term development vision was aided further by the Asian Games serving as a vehicle for addressing urban spatial restructuring to enhance its own production/accumulation Guangzhou to spend only "five years to achieve ten-year amount of construction", allowing the growth of "GDP from so many construction projects" (Interview with Dr Deng, GZASS, 19
May 2011). In particular, the Asian Games enabled the Guangzhou municipality to consolidate its long-term ambition to transform the city from a city of single core (centred on old city districts) to a multi-centric city (Lu and McCarthy, 2008) . Guangzhou's ambitious promotion of these new growth centres demonstrated the city's shifting emphasis on spatial approaches to urban development from a 'development district (kaifaqu)' strategy to a 'new town construction' (xincheng jianshe) strategy, a path that is being replicated by many other Chinese cities in recent years (Hsing, 2010) . The latter strategy was employed particularly in rural areas at the urban fringe, which were brought under the control of urban governments for the acquisition of land-premium through the sales of 'granted land use-rights' to developers (ibid.).
The development of the Tianhe New Town Urban Core (hereafter Tianhe UC) is pivotal in
Guangzhou's urban development and is further scrutinised here. Originally, the city's 14th masterplan, approved by the State Council in 1984, envisaged a compact development plan with three urban cores consisting of (i) the old city districts, (ii) Tianhe as a business district, and (iii)
Huangpu as an industrial concentration (Xu and Yeh, 2003:365) . Part of the business functions originally located in the old city districts (especially around the Garden Hotel area in Yuexiu District) therefore began to shift towards Tianhe District. This transition was facilitated by (Ren, 2011) and Guangzhou was no exception. The whole process was facilitated to ensure key projects were complete in time for the Games opening. An international architect explains:
"At that time, the party secretary and the city authority were very keen to make the building complete as quickly as possible before the Asian Games, so the method they used was that the government organised the design competition, then also organised efforts to find the master design, and then appointed state-owned enterprise as a developer to actually deliver it...It was a very highly political event" (Interview with an international architect, 29 September 2009).
( Figure 1 here)
The use of the Asian Games also seemed to have enabled the Guangzhou municipality to secure an extra quota of construction land for more development projects. Critics often point out that
China's urbanisation has been a process of land-based accumulation, in which land becomes an important asset for government finance and its development an integral component of economic development (Hsing, 2010; . In recent years, converting agricultural land to urban use had been controlled through the central state's assertion of the land quota system, determined by five-to-ten year land use planning with annual targets projects for the Asian Games also received "green light" when processing applications for land use permission so that "they were given a priority" (ibid.).
Economic indicators demonstrate how Guangzhou gained from the concentration of resources in its investment in the built environment. In terms of year-on-year growth rates of total fixed asset investments between 2005 and 2010, Guangzhou showed generally a better performance than other cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen (see Table 1 ). While the global financial crisis also hit China and especially the PRD region's export industry, Guangzhou's economic growth was not much deterred between 2008 and 2010. The Guangzhou Asian Games facilitated the concentration of locally-driven investment activities in times of the Games preparation.
Selective surgical intervention for redevelopment and beautification
Promoting Guangzhou as a world-class city accompanies a large scale of urban make-over. The 2010 Asian Games also served as a vehicle to lay the foundation for urban redevelopment to exploit the city's real estate development potential. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, citywide redevelopment of dilapidated urban space had been challenging, especially due to the high density of population and building, and high costs of relocating and re-housing local Guangzhou residents. The preparation for the Asian Games provided justification to speed up the progress of urban redevelopment by implementing urban beautification in old city districts in particular and making strategic interventions in selective redevelopment project sites. In other words, while the intense restructuring of urban spatial configuration in Guangzhou involved the city's outward expansion to build new urban centres in suburban areas, it has also sought inward densification, looking for sites of accumulation through redevelopment.
Government investments were poured into improving Guangzhou's appearance and renovating building facades, and make the city more 'presentable' to visitors and to the media. In the words of the then Party Secretary of Guangzhou, "the imminent task is to take the Asian Games as a moment to ensure the substantial change to the city's environmental appearance by 2010" The spatial restructuring is not conflict-free. In particular, preparations for mega-events often involve displacement of local residents. In the case of Guangzhou's nine VICs whose redevelopment was prioritised for completion by the opening of the Asian Games (see Figure   2 ), 16,000 original village households and a much higher number of migrant tenants were to be affected by the demolition. Mega-events are often pursued by top-down decision-making, and this may worsen conflicts over space (Hayes and Horne, 2011) . Previous studies on the Beijing Olympic Games also suggest that the costs were borne by socio-economically marginalised groups Shin and Li, forthcoming) . Ironically, these costs were often borne without huge protests due to the prevailing ideological imposition by the state that attributed a great degree of national significance to the successful hosting of the Games (ibid.). Within Guangzhou, the extensive spatial restructuring has incurred various protests by local residents to defend their right to housing and land (see Shin, 2013 for example), directed often at the 'predatory' local states than the 'benign' central state (So, 2007) . However, protests against the Asian Games itself seemed to have been rare.
Conclusion
The 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games was the concluding moment of China's endeavour to stage the country in the world. While the Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai World Expo were more closely associated with the nationalist sentiment (endorsing the achievement of China's economic and political rise in the world), the Asian Games remained comparatively a low-key event.
As the provincial capital of the Guangdong province, Guangzhou's preparation for the Asian Games was used in such a way as to sustain its own standing in the country while attempting to realise its development vision to become a world-class city as well as the international regional centre. The city's engagement with the scalar politics is a realisation of multi-scalar activities that involve both intra-provincial competition and 'negotiated scale-
The city's experience of hosting the Games provides some important lessons for our understanding of how regional cities may pursue their development goals under the strong central state, and how event-led development contributes to this. First, Guangzhou's experience signals the rise of a regional city that attempts to 'jump scale' to connect with the world and reposition itself as the international regional centre. However, this 'scale-jump' is not what often tends to result from more conflictual local-central relations in which the place-dependent alliances at local scales might face confrontational central state (Park, 2005) . Guangzhou's 'scale-jump' strategy is locally driven within a uniquely different context of the strong state. For
Guangzhou, its 'scale-jump' was negotiated in that it (together with the Guangdong province)
had to engage in constant negotiations with the central state to test the limit of their geopolitical expansion. This was testified in Guangzhou's positioning as the third largest city without explicit attempts to surpass Beijing or Shanghai, while making sure that they stay above Tianjin or Shenzhen and become an influential regional centre, both domestically and internationally.
The Asian Games was used strategically as a way of making possible this double-edged development strategy.
To this extent, Guangzhou's experience testifies to the continuing importance of the scale of nation-state in China urban studies. Unlike the contemporary understanding of 'scale-jump' as a deterritorial or denationalising strategy in times of globalisation (Brenner, 1999 ), Guangzhou's 'scale-jump' is a process of re-nationalising to ensure maximum political and economic gains are achieved in a reshaped central-local state relationship. In other words, in the midst of intense competition among local states in China in times of economic decentralisation and China's ascendency in the global market, China's local states attempt to jump scale upward (connecting with transnational capital or supranational agencies) or downward (promoting intra-regional reconfiguration of territorial organisations). These attempts are realised only through the mediation of and negotiation with the central state. This process of a 'negotiated scale-jump' is crucial for China's Party State whose primary concern is to ensure national political stability and who has been strengthening its control through various means including stronger management of local Party cadres (Edin, 2003) .
Second, Guangzhou's developmental pursuit to become a domestic and international regional centre was supported firmly by the spatial manifestation of the city's strategic development plans. The Asian Games experience testifies to the transformative role of local governments in their entrepreneurial push for urban accumulation through spatial restructuring and urban redevelopment for land resource mobilisation and urban make-over. The preparation for the Games reflected the expansionary boosterism that typified the decades-long development of China's cities, built on heavy productive investment in fixed assets. For Guangzhou, this expansionary boosterism had been justified by the city's development vision to become the international regional centre and a world-class city. Guangzhou's hosting of the 2010 Asian
Games provided the city with a window of opportunities to initiate and streamline its longanticipated development projects, defending fast-tracked fixed asset investments. These investments were using mostly the city's own resources, which contrasts strongly with what has been reported in Western, post-industrial cities that rely heavily on global investment or central state subsidies. Instead of mega-events acting as a prerequisite for future development, megaevent hosting itself was embedded in the stream of speculative investments in fixed assets to ensure urban development and capital accumulation. Nine prioritised VICs and their redevelopment status by the Asian Games opening 
